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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE CITY OF SALT LAKE, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID SOLOMON GRIEGO, : Case No. 20010048-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Whether the trial court erred in determining Mr. Griego was not indigent and 
whether denying him court appointed counsel warrants a new trial? 
Standard of Review: M[T]he underlying empirical facts regarding [a] claim of 
indigency are reviewable for clear error: the conclusion as to whether those facts qualify 
the defendant as indigent is reviewable for correctness" State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 
281 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation: At pretrial, Mr. Griego asked for and was denied the appointment of 
counsel. R. 95-96. This issue is therefore preserved for review. 
Alternatively, this Court is able to review the issue pursuant to the doctrines of 
plain error and exceptional circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). Moreover, the deprivation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel affects the entire proceeding and fairness of the 
trial, and requires reversal regardless of whether the issue was raised below. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (representation by counsel is fundamental 
and the "requisite to the very existence of a fair trial). 
Plain error occurs when the trial court makes an obvious error which prejudices 
the defendant. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. The error in failing to adequately inquire 
into Appellant's financial status before depriving him of court appointed counsel and the 
failure to ensure that Appellant's right to counsel was protected was obvious in light of 
State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994), a variety of cases discussing the right to 
court appointed counsel, as well as statutory provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel. 
See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-202 and 77-32-302 (1999). The error prejudiced 
Appellant in that he was convicted and sentenced without the aid of counsel. See 
generally State v. Bakalov, 864 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that an error in 
failing to properly determine whether Appellant waived his right to counsel and should 
be allowed to proceed pro se was not harmless). Given the fundamental and important 
role counsel plays in a criminal case, deprivation of the right to counsel prejudices a 
defendant. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31. 
This issue can also be reviewed pursuant to the doctrine of exceptional 
circumstances. See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11. The exceptional circumstances doctrine is not 
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as precisely defined as the doctrine of plain error. Id. It generally applies to allow 
review of an error where procedural anomalies occur which deprive a criminal defendant 
of a fair trial. LdL In cases where a trial court errs in failing to appoint counsel, a 
defendant's right to counsel is violated. Such a defendant generally does not know how 
to object or otherwise preserve an issue for appellate review. In a case such as this where 
the Appellant's right to counsel was violated, exceptional circumstances require that this 
Court review the issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the following constitutional provision and statutes is in Addendum B: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
Indigent Defense Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-101 to -704 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, after a minimal inquiry into Defendant's 
indigency status, denied court appointed counsel at pretrial for David Solomon Griego. 
R. 95-96. 
After a bench trial in Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Sheila K. 
McCleve presiding, the Defendant was convicted of Illegal Possession/Use of a 
Controlled Substance, based upon marijuana found in the Defendant's possession 
(R. 54-56); Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, based upon failed field 
sobriety tests (R.60-68); Purchase/Possession of Tobacco by a Minor, based upon the 
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Defendant being 18 at the time (R. 59-68); and Too Fast for Existing Conditions, based 
upon officer's testimony (R. 57-58). In violation of Salt Lake City Code §§11.24.020, 
12.24.100, 11.44.050, and 12.36.010(1996). The Defendant was found guilty on all 
counts. 
The Defendant was sentenced on December 15, 2000, by the Honorable Ann 
Boyden to serve, and did serve 45 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. See Addendum A. 
On January 4, 2001, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed by the 
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, at pretrial, asked for and was denied counsel on January 8, 1997, 
by the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve. The only inquiry into the Defendant's request for 
counsel and indigency status was as follows: 
Griego: How do I go about getting my public defender? 
Judge: Have you got a job? 
Griego: Yes. 
Judge: How much do you make? 
Griego: Not very much. 
Judge: How are you getting to Arizona? [where Griego attended school] 
Griego: How am I getting to Arizona? Uh. I am... 
Judge: Got a plane ticket or are you driving? 
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Griego: Yes, I've got a plane ticket. 
Judge: So if you can fly to Arizona and go to school and you have a job then 
you probably don't qualify to have a lawyer. You can hire one if you 
want to. 
Griego: I see. Well I guess I can always represent myself. 
Judge: Or you can represent yourself. That's right. Thursday the 20th at 10:00. 
You can go see the clerk right now. 
R. 95-96. 
Judge McCleve denied the Defendant David Solomon Griego counsel in the 
above exchange at pretrial on January 8, 1997. R. 95-96. In the Defendant's bench trial, 
in which Judge Sheila K. McCleve also presided, the issue of indigency and appointment 
of counsel was never taken up again. R. 52-83. 
The Defendant was sentenced to and served 45 days by the Honorable Ann 
Boyden on December 15, 2000 (R. 85-89). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment and Utah statutes by denying 
Appellant's right to counsel without making an adequate inquiry as to whether he could 
afford to retain counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED WHERE THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND UTAH STATUTES BY 
FAILING TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER 
APPELLANT WAS INDIGENT. 
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A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. See State v. Bakalov. 979 P. 2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999). 
"If an accused is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel." State v. Heaton , 958 
P. 2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). "The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously protected by the trial 
court." IdL; accord Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 
799 (1963) (stating "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him"). 
The Sixth Amendment embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth 
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to 
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life 
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned 
counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer - to the 
untrained layman - may appear intricate, complex and mysterious. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
However, the right to appointed counsel is not absolute. When a defendant is 
charged with a misdemeanor crime, counsel is not necessarily guaranteed." Layton City 
v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Rather, the right to counsel for a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor attaches only if the court determines, pretrial, to impose jail time. See Scott 
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 99, S.Ct. 1158, 1160, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2014, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). In this case, 
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Bergstrom was sentenced to serve fourteen days of a possible six-month sentence. Thus, 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated. "The denial of the constitutional 
right to counsel requires reversal." InreW.BJ , 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The inquiry conducted by the trial court in this case does not begin to meet the 
degree of scrutiny necessary to protect the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. 
"Determining whether a defendant [is indigent] is a fact-intensive inquiry," requiring a 
consideration of the defendants entire financial situation. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 
283 (Utah 1994). Our Supreme Court has stated that courts making an indigence 
determination should consider the defendant's employment status and earning capacity; 
financial aid from family or friends; financial assistance from state and federal programs; 
[the defendant's] necessary living expenses and liabilities; [the defendant's] 
unencumbered assets, or any disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity." IcL_ at 283-84 
(citation & footnotes omitted). 
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the Indigent Defense Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-32-101 to -704 (1999) (the Act). The Act codifies and implements the 
procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302 
(1999) requires that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants who face a substantial 
probability of jail. 
The Act further details the necessary inquiry into a criminal defendant's claim of 
indigence. When a defendant has asked for court-appointed counsel, the [trial] court 
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shall consider: 
(I) the probable expense and burden of defending the case; 
(II) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible 
personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of 
any such interest; 
(III) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that might 
reasonably be incurred by the defendant because of illness or 
other needs within the defendant's family; 
(IV) number, ages, and relationship of any dependents; and 
(V) other relevant factors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3)(b) (1999). Section 77-32-202 "squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and [statutory] requirements are 
complied with." State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) (guilty plea 
context). In this case, the trial court considered none of the factors articulated in Vincent 
or in Section 77-32-202 of the Act. 
The record shows that the trial court considered only one fact pertinent to 
Griego's claim of indigence; his employment status. R. 95-96. The only inquiry the 
court performed is as follows: 
Griego: How do go about getting my public defender? 
Judge: Have you got a job? 
Griego: Yes. 
Judge: How much do you make? 
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Griego: Not very much. 
Judge: How are you getting to Arizona? 
Griego: How am I getting to Arizona? Uh. I am... 
Judge: Got a plane ticket or are you driving? 
Griego: Yes, I've got a plane ticket. 
Judge: So if you can fly to Arizona and go to school and you have a 
job then you probably don't qualify to have a lawyer. You can 
hire one if you want to. 
Griego: I see. Well I guess I can always represent myself. 
R. 95-96. 
The trial court's inquiry into Griego's claim of indigence was deficient as a matter 
of law and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel as well as 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-202 and 77-32-301. Given the fundamental role played by 
counsel in a criminal trial and the overwhelming impact of the deprivation of the right to 
counsel on the fairness of a trial (see discussion supra at 2), a new trial is required. In re 
W.B.J., 966 P.2d at 296 (denial of the constitutional right to counsel requires a new trial). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant David Solomon Griego respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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SUBMITTED this I J day of February, 2002. 
TSAAC MCDOUGALL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ISAAC McDOUGALL, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, 
P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Agustus Chin, 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this f^ day of February, 2002. 
<? 
ISAAC MCDOUGALL ^  (J 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
Office as indicated above this day of February, 2002. 
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ADDENDUM A 
CftTWATC 
-VS-
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
Case Number 
Tape number C # 
Plaintiff 
Date ft-ft ~C£> Time 
^ ^ D . . . U W L J y ^ O J l Judge/Comm ANN M O W N 
^ Defendant Clerk,_., )£~j ._ 
DOB:
 m.L0j3jjL/ Plaintiff Counsel _ 
Interpreter „
 A> x ~. ^ .. Defense Counsel. 
CHARQF.fi. 
THE COURT SENTENCED TH! 
Amended 
E DEFENDANT AS F6LL0WS: rftAj d 
trD/A^Ll 1/1 „ _ ^ Suspended (1) Jail 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
(2) Finn Amt. $ _ Susp. $. 
tiS™ 
FeeS. Fine Bal $. 
Payment Schedule; Pay $_ 
(3) Court Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt Due ^_ 
TOTAL F!NE(S) DUE S 
Last Pmt Due 
(4) Community Qcrvioo/WP , through 
(5) Restitution $ Pay to: D Court • Victim D Show Proof to Court 
Attorney Foos S 
(B) Probation D Good Behavior DAP&P DACEC • Other 
(?) Ternis of probation: 
U No Further Violations 
D AA MiOfctings / wk__ 
O Counseling thru. 
,/ month D Classes 
G Follow Program 
U No Alcohol 
CJ Arrfibuso 
CJ Employment — 
n Proof of 
• In/Out Treatment. 
• Health Testing 
D Crime Lab Procedure 
• 
• 
(0) Plo;i in Abeyance Diversion 
(0) Ftoviow _ _ I / at . 
Xhyc^u^ /5o*r*z**~<tu^ In coinpliiinca w»th tha Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
nocMjinrj opectai accommodations (Including auxiliary communicative 
aid.-; and .service) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court a[ 233-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPPAI, MUG r m FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGEMENT STAMP USED Jtf^UtfECTION OF JUDGE 
INTEREST W i l l BE ADDED IF FINE AND/OR RESTITUTION NOT PAID IN FULL TODAY 
Cffirict Court Judgfe 
ADDENDUM B 
77-32-101. Indigent Defense Act. 
This chapter is known as the "Indigent Defense Act/' 
77-32-202. Procedure for determination of indigency — 
Standards. 
(1) A determination of indigency or continuing indigency of any defendant 
may be made by the court at any stage of the proceedings 
(2) (a) Any defendant claiming indigency who is charged with a crime the 
penalty of which is a class A misdemeanor or felony shall file with the court 
a fully complete affidavit verified by a notary or other person authorized by 
law to administer an oath and file a copy of that affidavit with the 
prosecuting entity. The affidavit shall contain the factual information 
required in this section and by the court. 
(b) A defendant claiming indigency who is charged with a crime the 
penalty of which is less than a class A misdemeanor is not required to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(a) and Subsection (4). 
(3) (a) "Indigency" means tha t a person: 
(i) does not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to 
provide for the payment of legal counsel and all other necessary 
expenses of representation without depriving that person or the 
family of that person of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities; 
or 
(ii) has an income level at or below 150% of the United States 
poverty level as defined by the most recently revised poverty income 
guidelines published by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services; and 
(iii) has not transferred or otherwise disposed of any assets since 
the commission of the offense with the intent of establishing eligibility 
for the appointment of counsel under this chapter. 
(b) In making a determination of indigency, the court shall consider: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible 
personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any 
such interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that might 
reasonably be incurred by the defendant because of illness or other 
needs within the defendant's family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any dependents; and 
(v) other relevant factors. 
(4) Upon making a finding of indigence, the court shall enter the findings on 
the record and enter an order assigning defense counsel to represent the 
defendant in the case. The clerk of the court shall send a copy of the affidavit 
and order to the prosecutor. 
(5) If the county or municipality providing the defense counsel has any 
objections to or concerns with the finding of indigency and assignment of 
defense counsel or the continuing of indigency status and assignment of a 
public defender, it shall file notice with the court and a hearing shall be 
scheduled to review the findings and give the county or municipality the 
opportunity to present evidence and arguments as to the reasons the finding of 
indigency should be reversed. 
(6) (a) If the trial court finds within one year after the determination of 
indigency that any defendant was erroneously or improperly determined 
to be indigent, the county or municipality may proceed against that 
defendant for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the 
defendant, including all costs paid by the county or municipality in 
providing the defense counsel. 
(b) Subsection (6)(a) does not affect any restitution required of the 
defendant by the court pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs. 
77-32-302, Assignment of counsel on request of indigent 
or order of court. 
(1) Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent who is under arrest 
for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability that the 
penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if: 
(a) the indigent requests it; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant 
does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity to be 
represented. 
(2) (a) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal 
defense of an indigent has arranged by contract to provide those services 
and the court has received notice or a copy of such contract, the court shall 
assign the contracting attorney as legal counsel to represent that indigent. 
(b) The court shall select and assign an attorney if: 
li) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attor-
neys; or 
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of 
interest. 
(c) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney to 
provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of an 
indigent legal sendees contract and the court has a copy or notice of the 
contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the respon-
sible county or municipality; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a 
noncontracting attorney. 
(d) The indigent's mere preference for other counsel may not be consid-
ered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting 
attorney. 
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time. 
